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Abstract 
Over the past century and a half, Spain has had a tumultuous political history. What impact 
has this had on social policy? Democracy has had a positive effect on both the levels of 
social spending and its long-term growth trend. With the arrival of democracy in 1931, the 
transition began from a traditional regime (with low levels of social spending) to a modern 
regime (with high levels of social spending). Franco’s dictatorship, however, reversed this 
change in direction, retarding the positive growth in social spending. At the same time, the 
effect of left-wing parties was statistically significant only in the nineteen-thirties (prior to 
the Keynesian consensus) and in the period of the Bourbon Restoration (when the 
preferences of low-income groups were systematically ignored).  
JEL Codes: I30, H53, N30. 
Keywords: Welfare State, Dictatorship, Democracy, Redistribution, Spain, History of 
social policy 
 
Resumen 
En el último siglo y medio, España ha tenido una convulsa historia política. ¿Cuál ha sido 
el impacto sobre la política social? La democracia tuvo un efecto positivo tanto sobre los 
niveles como sobre la tendencia a largo plazo del gasto social. Con la llegada de la 
democracia en 1931 se inició, de hecho, la transición de un régimen tradicional (con bajos 
niveles de gasto social) a un régimen moderno (con altos niveles de gasto social). La 
dictadura franquista, sin embargo, revirtió este cambio de tendencia, retrasando el 
crecimiento definitivo del gasto social en España. Al mismo tiempo, el efecto de los 
partidos de izquierdas solo fue estadísticamente significativo en los años 30 (antes del 
consenso keynesiano) y en el periodo de la Restauración (cuando las preferencias de los 
grupos de renta baja eran ignoradas sistemáticamente). 
 
Códigos JEL: I30, H53, N30 
Palabras clave: Estado del Bienestar, Dictadura, Democracia, Redistribución, España, 
Historia de la política social 
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Political Regime and Public Social Spending in Spain: 
A Time-Series Analysis (1850-2000) 
 
 
Polanyi (2001[1944]) described the social history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
as the result of a double movement: an unprecedented growth of market mechanisms, in 
parallel to the development of “a network of measures and policies (…) designed to check 
the action of the market relative to labour, land, and money” (p. 79). This process, he 
added, “may happen in a great variety of ways, democratic and aristocratic, constitutionalist 
and authoritarian” (p. 259). Even today, however, there is no consensus on the impact of 
the political regime on the development of social policy. Initially, one would expect the 
expansion of suffrage and the advancement of democracy to have a positive effect (Lindert 
2004, Haggard and Kaufman 2008). However, there are also examples of social policy 
being developed under nondemocratic governments, such as that of Bismarck’s Germany. 
Indeed, Mulligan et al. (2010) and Cutler and Johnson (2004) take the view that 
dictatorships also have incentives to increase social spending, whether for reasons of 
economic efficiency or to achieve political legitimacy. In Spain, the development of social 
policy took place in the midst of a tumultuous political history, alternating democratic and 
non-democratic periods. This has made Spain into an interesting case study. Certainly, 
Spain’s most important difference with respect to Western Europe emerged after World 
War II, when democracy became well established in most European countries, while, in 
Spain, Franco’s dictatorship lasted until 1976/77. According to Tusell (2005), “if there 
exists a crucial break in the Spanish history, it is the one that occurred [during the Francoist 
dictatorship] after the civil war” (p. 11). One must ask, therefore, how these specific 
historical characteristics affected the development of social policy, and what lessons can be 
drawn from the Spanish case about the relation between the political regime and social 
spending.   
This study examines the relationship between the political regime and social spending in 
1850-2000 Spain by means of a time-series analysis. A long-term analysis as the one 
proposed here is interesting for several reasons. The development of social policy is, in 
fact, a long-term process. In the Spanish case, as in many European countries, the origins of 
social policy can be traced back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Moreover, this process typically had a cumulative effect. The legislative momentum of a 
period often carries over into subsequent periods. If the historical perspective is not taken 
into account, it is easy to give credit to the wrong regime. However, most quantitative 
studies focus on shorter (and more recent) time-periods, using panel-data sets. The main 
counterfactual is, therefore, the (political) experience of other countries. But the logic of the 
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theories on the impact of the political regime on social spending refers to evolutions within 
a single country. In this sense, it is also interesting to analyse the impact of regime type 
within the same country across time. 
The Spanish case, in turn, is interesting because, as noted earlier, the country went through 
numerous political regime changes between 1850 and 2000, alternating democratic and 
nondemocratic periods. However, even though the history of Spanish social policy has been 
analysed extensively, there are no long-run, econometric analyses on the determinants of 
social spending. This paper is, therefore, a good complement to the existing historical 
studies and the hypothesis raised by them. The results indicate that democracy had a 
positive effect on both the levels of social spending and its long-term growth trend. With 
the arrival of democracy in 1931, the transition began from a traditional regime (with low 
social spending) to a modern regime (with high social spending). Franco’s dictatorship, 
however, interrupted this process, retarding the positive growth in social spending. 
Additionally, the effect of left-wing parties was more significant in the 1930s (prior to the 
Keynesian consensus) and in the Bourbon Restoration (when low-income groups’ 
preferences were systematically ignored) than in today’s democracy. This paper, therefore, 
contributes to the literature on the relationship between the political regime and social 
spending, and the literature on the impact of partisanship on social spending. 
 
1. Democracy, Political Parties and the Welfare State  
Early studies on the origins of the welfare state attributed its emergence and subsequent 
development to modern economic growth and industrialisation, which generated new social 
needs while traditional social protection systems of rural societies eroded. In this context, it 
became necessary to find new solutions, involving rising levels of state interventionism 
(Kerr et al. 1964, Pampel and Weiss 1983). Wilensky (1975), indeed, considers that 
economic growth and the ageing of population (one of the principal by-products of 
economic growth) are the most important factors to account for the growth in social 
spending in advanced countries. Other studies, however, have accorded greater importance 
to the role of political factors. According to Lindert (2004), for instance, the gradual 
expansion of voting rights had a positive effect on social spending in 1880-1930. Bringing 
low-income groups into the political process led to increased political support for 
redistribution. Similarly, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) and Espuelas (2012) contend that 
democracy had a positive effect on social spending in Europe and several developing 
countries after World War II.  
To the extent that the expansion of suffrage to all citizens shifted the median voter 
downward, these findings are consistent with the Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) hypothesis. 
In democracy, one would also expect a convergence between political parties toward the 
preferences of the median voter (Downs 1957). However, political parties do not always 
behave as the perfect agents of voters. They often have their own interests and preferences, 
and the ability to set the political agenda. When they choose which laws and proposals are 
debated and which ones are not, they can push the result (at least partially) away from the 
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preferences of the median voter and closer to their own preferences (Krehbiel 2004). This 
means that political parties ideologically committed to the development of social policy can 
(potentially) influence the political agenda by prioritising social issues, and vice versa. 
Political parties opposed to social spending can influence in the opposite direction. The 
theories that have, doubtless, paid the most attention to the role of political parties in the 
development of social policy are the so-called power-resource theories. 
According to these theories, democracy is positive for social policy, but it is seen as a 
necessary condition, not a sufficient one. For democracy to have a positive effect, the 
working class must take advantage of the opportunities afforded by democracy, organising 
in trade-unions and strong political parties (Korpi 1983). Hicks (1999) contends that the 
mobilisation of the working class did, in fact, play a key role in the initial stages of social 
policy. By 1920, only those countries with a strong labour movement had introduced three 
of the four most important types of social insurance: workplace accident compensation, 
old-age pensions, health insurance and unemployment insurance. However, Hicks also 
notes that the role of social-democracy became blurred after World War II, when the 
Keynesian consensus prevailed. Only in the nineteen-seventies and eighties, when that 
consensus began to break apart, did social-democracy again resume a prominent role in the 
defence of the welfare state within some countries. Wilensky (1981), however, maintains 
that Catholic parties were the greatest proponents of the development of social policy after 
World War II. Manow and Van Kersbergen (2009), instead, point out that this was the case 
primarily when they had to compete electorally against social-democratic parties. 
Shifting the focus slightly, Bradley et al. (2003) contend that if, instead of analysing 
aggregate social spending levels, one examines the ability of social policy to reduce 
inequality (after taxes and transfers), then left-wing governments show a clearly positive 
effect. The reason is that in countries dominated by Christian-democrats, social benefits 
may be relatively generous, but social policy tends to reproduce market inequalities. By 
contrast, in countries with greater prevalence of left-wing governments, social policy is 
more redistributive. These results, in turn, are consistent with the three types of welfare 
regimes proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990). 
Apart from these debates over the ideology of the party in government, there is also no 
consensus on the role of democracy per se. Mulligan et al. (2010), for instance, find that 
democracies are not more active than dictatorships in promoting growth in social security 
spending. Indeed, they consider that political institutions are irrelevant in this sense. In line 
with Wilensky (1975), they claim that the really important variables are economic growth 
and the ageing of population. Either of these variables would translate into growth in social 
security spending independently of the mechanisms of political participation. The authors 
do not explain in detail which alternative mechanisms are in operation in that case, but they 
mention the action of pressure groups and efficiency reasons. According to Sala-i-Martin 
(1996), for example, pensions improve the average stock of human capital in the economy, 
thereby generating positive externalities on economic growth and productivity. This would 
explain why both dictatorships and democracies have promoted their expansion. Cutler and 
Johnson (2004), for their part, do not deny the importance of political factors, but they also 
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think that dictatorships can stimulate the development of social policy in order to achieve 
political legitimacy and hold onto power.  
This same idea has been echoed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), who nonetheless give 
more attention to the incentive problems behind it. In a dictatorship, all formal political 
power, or de jure power, is in the hands of the governing elite. Only if the citizens are able 
to solve their collective-action problems and organise successfully can they achieve some 
de facto power that might pose a real threat to the government. At that point, the 
government will have incentives to make social concessions and maintain itself in power. 
However, as all de jure power is in the hands of the government, it will have no reason to 
keep its social promises as soon as the opposition demobilises. If citizens know this, they 
will not trust government’s social promises and will refuse to demobilise (making social 
concessions useless for the elite). In other words, even if the government is (initially) 
interested in making social concessions, it needs to find a way to solve its commitment 
problems and make credible promises. Otherwise, political concessions will not be 
implemented. But even in this case, redistribution in a dictatorship will be lower than in a 
democracy. The main reason is that citizens’ de facto power is temporary and, therefore, 
redistribution levels will only partially reflect the preferences of the majority of the 
population.1 
From a historical perspective, the package of measures approved by Bismarck in Germany 
would be a typical example of this sort of behaviour. Bismarck himself acknowledged in 
his address in the Reichstag in 1881 that the measures were partly a response to “the 
excesses of the socialists” (Rimlinger 1971, p.112). In the terms used by Acemoglu and 
Robinson, the de facto power of the German labour movement had succeeded in forcing 
social concessions from the government. Power-resource theories have focused their 
attention primarily on the role of left-wing parties in democracy. However, following the 
logic of Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), the role of the labour movement (and generally of 
any other opposition movement) could be equally important in non-democratic contexts. 
This is actually what is suggested by a number of qualitative studies on the history of 
Spanish social policy. 
 
2. Spanish Social Policy History 
At the close of the nineteenth century, a portion of the Spanish political elite began to 
express support for the development of social policy. They thought that it could be an 
effective means to safeguard political stability amid the advance of the labour movement 
and industrialisation. The publication of the encyclical Rerum Novarum in 1891 (in which 
the Church acknowledged that private charity was not enough to solve social problems) 
plus the package of social measures applied by Bismarck in Germany served as model and 
inspiration. Also, the introduction of universal male suffrage in Spain in 1890 aroused fear 
                                                          
1
 The assumption made by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) is that the elite is a minoritarian, relatively 
wealthy group and, therefore, opposed to redistribution. 
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in some political sectors. Cánovas del Castillo (who was prime minister several times 
between 1875 and 1897) was himself convinced that there could not be “universal suffrage 
without having a little sooner or a little later the practicing of state socialism” (p.30). This is 
why he saw Bismarck’s social policy as “a farsighted conception of the political necessities 
created by the impotence of the old economic dogmas, combined with (…) the agitation of 
the proletariat and the existing political system [universal male suffrage]” (p. 38). In that 
context, the government decided to create the Commission of Social Reforms in 1883. Its 
most important work was the so-called “Spoken and Written Information (1889-1893)”, a 
detailed study on the situation of the working class that compiled a great deal of 
information. However, the effort was not translated into any specific measure. In 1900, 
social protection still relied on private charity and the public system of poor-relief instituted 
with the Law of 1849. 
The path toward social insurance was opened with the 1900 Law of Occupational 
Accidents. The impact of this measure, however, was very limited. Benefits and resources 
for prevention were very low, limiting social spending growth, and enterprises often failed 
to fulfil their commitments due to the lack of inspection (Silvestre and Pons, 2010). Shortly 
afterwards, in 1908, the government set up the National Institute of Social Insurance (INP 
in Spanish, for Instituto Nacional de Previsión). The INP was charged with managing the 
so-called Retiro Obrero, or “Worker’s Retirement”, a state-subsidized, voluntary system 
for old-age pensions. This new programme, however, also grew very slowly. In 1918, the 
total number of insured persons stood at only 78,166, representing in the vicinity of 1% of 
the labour force (Elu, 2010). After World War I, social legislation received a new impetus. 
From 1917, there was intense social unrest as a consequence of the economic imbalances 
caused by the war and the contagious effect of the Russian Revolution. The government 
tried to regain political stability through a policy of social concessions, and in 1917 (in the 
so-called Conference of Social Insurance) it made a commitment to create a comprehensive 
social insurance system (which was supposed to cover occupational accidents, old-age, 
illness, maternity and unemployment). Between 1917 and 1923, a scheme for 
unemployment insurance and a scheme for health and maternity insurance were discussed 
in both the INP and the parliament. The socialist party (which in 1910 had won its first seat 
in parliament) demanded in its parliamentary speeches that the government fulfil its social 
promises. However, the only program that came to fruition was the Retiro Obrero 
Obligatorio, or “Compulsory Worker’s Retirement”, a compulsory old-age pension system 
created in 19192 (Elu 2006, Pons and Vilar 2014). 
Even though Cánovas del Castillo was convinced that universal suffrage would lead 
inevitably to socialism, Spanish social policy progressed very slowly during the Bourbon 
Restoration period (1874-1923). According to Guillén (1990), corruption, electoral fraud 
and caciquismo (a system of patronage and dominance by local bosses that was particularly 
                                                          
2
 This new scheme had to be an earnings-related, funded system. However, to avoid workers opposition, the 
government created a flat-rate pension, financed by compulsory contributions from employers and the state. 
Workers contributions (postponed for a second stage) were eventually introduced in June 1936, days before 
the civil war outbreak (Elu 2006). 
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widespread in rural areas) enabled the political elite to ignore bottom-up demands, 
especially before World War I. From this perspective, the few social achievements that 
occurred before 1914 would primarily have been top-down initiatives coming from the 
political elite itself. Other authors, by contrast, take a more nuanced view and contend that 
this top-down shift in attitude cannot be explained without the “Disaster of ‘98” (the 
political crisis occurring after the independence of Cuba and the Philippines) and the 
gradual growth of the labour movement (Gabriel 2004, Castillo and Montero 2008). 
However, even at times of social unrest (such as after World War I), the government was 
unable to keep its social promises.   
In 1923, after the military coup and the installation of Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship 
(1923-1930), the momentum of the preceding years ground to a halt. The proposed schemes 
for unemployment and maternity insurance were abandoned. But, pre-existing insurances, 
such as workplace accident insurance and old-age pensions, continued to operate; and 
subsidies for large families were created in 1927, a policy that was consistent with Catholic 
social morality and the influence acquired by the Church during the dictatorship (Velarde 
1990). Indeed, the dictatorship strove for social pacification through a combination of 
repression and the establishment of corporatist formulas. The CNT, which was the anarchist 
trade-union and the largest at the time, was persecuted, but at the same time joint 
committees were created to try to regulate collective bargaining with the participation of 
the UGT, the socialist trade-union (Pérez Ledesma 1990). With the advent of the Second 
Republic (1931-36), which is viewed by Linz et al. (2005) as the first truly democratic 
period in the Spanish history, social legislation received a new impetus. Progress was 
particularly striking in the first two-year period, when the socialist party was in the 
government (Samaniego 1988). The Constitution of 1931 recognised the right to social 
security. Between 1931 and 1932, maternity insurance (which delivered maternity-leave 
benefits and healthcare during childbirth for working women) came into effect; a voluntary, 
state-subsidised unemployment insurance scheme was set up; occupational accident 
insurance was made compulsory and coverage was extended to agriculture3. Also, a plan 
was devised to unify social insurances, with the aim of creating a single system of social 
security encompassing maternity and old-age insurances, which were already in existence, 
along with new insurances covering illness, disability, orphans and widows. Finally, the 
government put heavy investment into public works to combat unemployment, especially 
in rural areas, and strove to carry out an agrarian reform to reduce social unrest in the 
countryside and consolidate the democratisation process initiated in 1931. However, the 
outbreak of the civil war (1936-39) thwarted these plans. 
After the civil war, Franco’s dictatorship combatted social unrest through a combination of 
severe political repression and a precarious social safety net, which was fundamentally 
targeted at low and medium-income industrial workers. Most of the social-insurance 
schemes created before the civil war continued to operate, but the dictatorship abolished the 
                                                          
3
 Employers were forced to pay for occupational accident benefits since 1900. However, they were free to 
contract a private insurance or joining an employers’ mutual insurance scheme. After the reform, joining any 
of these two options became compulsory (Pons 2006). 
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existing unemployment insurance and shelved the Republican project of social insurance 
unification. New insurance programs, however, were also created. In 1938, for example, 
before the end of the civil war, a family allowance called Subsidio Familiar was 
introduced. This offered bonus payments to all (male) wage-earners based on the number of 
children. This program was largely the result of the anti-feminist and pro-population-
growth ideology of the dictatorship (Espuelas 2012). Retirement pensions were overhauled 
in 1939, introducing a pay-as-you-go system with flat-rate pensions. Rural workers were 
initially excluded, but were reincorporated in 1943. Disability and widows’ pensions, for 
their part, were introduced as a specific case of old-age pensions in 1947 and 1956, 
respectively (note, however, that these benefits had already been envisaged in the 
Republican project for social insurance unification, in 1936).    
A compulsory health-insurance scheme (SOE in Spanish, for Seguro Obligatorio de 
Enfermedad), was set up in 1942-44, becoming a key piece in the dictatorship’s political 
propaganda (Pons and Vilar 2014). At first, coverage was limited to industrial workers. 
Agricultural permanent and casual workers were not incorporated into the SOE until 1953 
and 1958, respectively.4 Occupational health insurance, for its part, was not put into 
operation until 1947, even though the framework law had originally been approved in 1936, 
in the second republic; and rural and urban workers remained in separated schemes for 
occupational accidents until 1955 (Pons 2011). However, the insurance that lagged the most 
was unemployment insurance, which was not instituted until 1961 (Espuelas 2013). In 
addition to this network of independent social-insurance schemes, the dictatorship also 
created the so-called Labour Mutualism (or Mutualismo Laboral). Formally, it was a series 
of mutual associations financed and administered by employers and workers, grouped by 
economic sectors. In practice, however, Labour Mutualism was tightly regulated and 
overseen by the state (setting benefit levels, access conditions, the amount of employers’ 
and workers’ contributions, etc.). This turned it de facto into a parallel system to the official 
social-insurance schemes (De la Calle 1994). 
This piecemeal approach started to be corrected in 1967, when the Social Security reform 
of 1963/66 came into effect. Existing social programmes were brought together under a 
single, more streamlined social security system, and coverage was extended to all wage 
earners (instead of limiting it to low and medium-income workers)5. However, Spanish 
social policy continued to marginalise the population without stable ties to the labour 
market; and the funding of social security continued to rely on employers’ and workers’ 
compulsory contributions (with almost no public funding) during the entirety of the 
dictatorship (Comín 2010a). In spite of the limitations, social spending began to grow 
rapidly after 1967. This increase also coincided with a period of rapid economic growth. 
For Rodríguez Cabrero (2004), the development of social policy in this period was “the 
necessary response to late Fordism (…) and to an urbanising society” (p. 76). Since it was a 
necessary response, it follows that the dictatorship was not a significant obstacle to social 
                                                          
4
 More details on the social-insurance gap between rural and urban workers in Vilar and Pons (2015). 
5
 Additionally, private insurance companies were removed from occupational accident insurance management 
(Pons 2011). 
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policy. Guillén (2000) goes slightly further and maintains that Francoist leaders promoted 
social insurance to improve the regime’s political image. In some cases, she argues, (such 
as that of health insurance), the dictatorship was even more effective than democracy when 
it came to ignoring pressure groups opposing compulsory insurance (such as employers, 
insurers and medical professionals). 
Navarro (2000), by contrast, contends that the political repression of Franco’s dictatorship 
was particularly severe on the labour movement and low-income groups, halting the 
development of social policy. Comín (2010b), indeed, considers that dictatorship and 
welfare state are incompatible concepts, as the development of the welfare state requires 
some kind of social pact. Social dialogue, indeed, played a crucial role in the transition to 
democracy. In 1977, the Moncloa Pacts were signed against a backdrop of acute economic 
crisis. Representatives of workers, employers and the main political parties agreed to 
implement policies of wage moderation, macroeconomic stabilization and inflation control 
in return for greater social protection, progressive fiscal reform and the consolidation of 
political freedoms. These Pacts were crucial for the consolidation of democracy and 
economic stability. The introduction of income tax in 1977 broke one of the most important 
historical barriers to the development of Spanish social policy6. From then on, rising 
government subsidies were allocated to social security institutions (which had previously 
been funded almost exclusively through compulsory contributions from employers and 
workers). Access to healthcare was universalised in 1986. In 1982, welfare benefits for 
disabled persons improved dramatically and, in 1990, new non-contributory, old-age and 
disability benefits were introduced. Also in the nineteen-nineties, the governments of 
Spain’s autonomous communities gradually introduced minimum income programmes for 
low-income families. 
All of this represented a gradual improvement in social provision and it permitted coverage 
to be expanded to sectors without stable ties to the labour market (although non-
contributory benefits lagged far behind contributory benefits). Despite the advancements, 
however, there were moments at which the development of social policy appeared to 
decelerate during democracy too. The belated modernization of Spanish social policy took 
place in an adverse international context. The Keynesian consensus, built after World War 
II, was being challenged, especially after the electoral victory of Reagan and Thatcher. 
Even social-democratic and labour parties in several European countries accepted the logic 
of marketization and public spending control, leading to the so-called “third-way” (Offer 
and Söderberg 2016, Wilson and Bloomfield 2011). In Spain, Comín (2008) identifies a 
period of rapid expansion of social spending in 1977-1984. Then, from 1985 onwards, the 
Spanish government introduced a number of measures to limit social spending. This new 
tendency consolidated after the Maastricht Treaty of 1992-93 (when economic policy 
became primarily targeted at controlling public deficit and inflation) and particularly after 
the Toledo Pact of 1995, which was aimed at ensuring the financial stability of the pension 
system. However, it would be precipitate to conclude that democracy did not have a 
                                                          
6
 About the impact of poor fiscal capacity on Spanish social policy configuration see, for example, Comín 
(2010b) and Vilar and Pons (2015). 
11 
 
positive impact on social policy. As Comín (2008) indicates, Spain (gradually) converged 
to the European levels after democratization in 1977. The next section contributes to this 
debate by means of a time-series analysis. 
 
3. Empirical test 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of Spanish public social spending in 1850-2000 as a 
percentage of GDP. The data come from Espuelas (2013), and fits the OECD’s definitions 
of public social spending. As can be seen, Spanish social spending remained practically 
stagnant with minor fluctuations until 1919. At that point, a period of growth began (after a 
peak in that year), including the years of Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship. In 1931, with the 
advent of the Second Republic, social spending growth accelerated, and kept growing in the 
years immediately after the civil war (probably because previous programs were kept into 
operation and new ones were introduced, such as family allowance and sickness insurance). 
Then social spending remained stagnant between 1945 and 1965, during Franco’s 
dictatorship. Subsequently, a new period of social spending growth began in 1966/67, 
which continued during the transition to democracy, until it finally stabilised at relatively 
high levels from 1993 onwards.     
 
Figure 1. Spanish public social spending (% of GDP), 1850-2000  
 
Source: Espuelas (2013). The Appendix reports the data without the log-scale. The series includes social 
spending by the Spanish central government, the autonomous communities, and the Social Security benefits. 
Municipal and provincial social spending has been excluded, because they have many gaps; less than 90 
0.01
0.10
1.00
10.00
100.00
1
8
5
0
1
8
5
5
1
8
6
0
1
8
6
5
1
8
7
0
1
8
7
5
1
8
8
0
1
8
8
5
1
8
9
0
1
8
9
5
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
5
1
9
1
0
1
9
1
5
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
5
1
9
3
0
1
9
3
5
1
9
4
0
1
9
4
5
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
5
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
lo
g
-s
ca
le
12 
 
observations are available. Moreover, the series are not cointegrated when we use this smaller and 
discontinuous sample. Nonetheless, excluding local social spending should not involve a significant change, 
as Spanish social insurance development was the sole responsibility of the central government (and the 
autonomous communities after their creation). Following Lindert (2004), civil-servants’ pensions have also 
been excluded. Instead of reflecting a turning point in state’s general social protection policies, these are 
rather the result of the particular employment relation between the State and its employees, so that the 
political economy behind them might be different. The main results hold when civil-servants’ pensions are 
included (although some interesting patterns for the period before 1931 are hidden, see footnote 14). Results 
are available upon request. 
 
At a glance, it is again hard to find a clear pattern between social spending growth and the 
political regime. For a more formal analysis of the role of the political regime, the 
following equation has been estimated:    
 
SS = α0 + β1PR + β2PM + β3Z + ε1    (1) 
 
where SS is Public Social Spending (as a % of GDP); PR is the Political Regime in power 
at each moment; PM is Political Mobilisation, and Z stands for a set of control variables. 
The data on SS are the ones shown in figure 1. As indicated before, the time-period 1850-
2000 covers several regime changes; and the year 2000 involves a reasonable time-span 
after the arrival of democracy in 1977, allowing us to test the impact of democracy as well 
as the impact of partisanship (as there were several center-right and center-left governments 
in this time-period). To measure the impact of Political Regime, the Spanish political 
history has been divided into several periods based on the definition of democracy provided 
by Boix et al. (2012). According to these authors, a country is democratic if it meets a few 
minimum requirements. It is considered democratic, firstly, if it holds competitive elections 
(that is, if the executive must answer to the voters and if the elections are free, without 
coercion by the executive or electoral fraud or corruption); and secondly, if at least 50% of 
the male population can vote. From here, they have created a new database with a 
dichotomous indicator on the existence of democracy, which includes 219 countries in 
1800-2007. According to their data, Spain has been democratic in 1931-36 and from 1977 
to the present. Even though the other periods were not democratic, they were also not 
homogeneous. Before World War I, for example, Spain had universal male suffrage 
(although caciquismo, fraud and electoral corruption prevent considering it a democracy). 
Prior to 1890, there was census suffrage and after the Spanish civil war, the country was 
ruled by a military dictatorship.   
For the purposes of this paper, it is interesting to examine whether each of these political 
regimes had a differentiated impact on social spending. Lindert (2004), for instance, notes 
that democracy had a positive impact on social spending, but that the most negative effect 
was not the result of dictatorships but rather of elite democracies (with census suffrage). 
Accordingly, the years in which Spain was not democratic have been divided into three 
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periods: the years of census suffrage (when only a small portion of the population was 
allowed to vote); the years of universal male suffrage (when most of the male population 
was allowed to vote, but as noted before the elections were not competitive), and the years 
of dictatorship that followed the military coups of 1923 and 1936-39. In the econometric 
analysis, therefore, three dummy variables have been introduced, taking value one in the 
years of universal male suffrage (1868-77; 1890-1922), democracy (1931-36; 1977-2000) 
and dictatorship (1923-30; 1939-76), and value zero otherwise7. The years of census 
suffrage or elite democracy have been used as a baseline8. 
In addition to political regime, the analysis includes a variable called, for the sake of 
simplicity, Political Mobilisation. The reason for this is that several of the theories 
mentioned in section 2 hold that the political regime is conditioned by the political pressure 
that citizens or given organised groups are able to exert from below. In the power-resource 
theories, for example, for a democracy to have a positive effect, the working class must 
take advantage of the opportunities afforded to them by democracy and vote for left-wing 
political parties. To control for this and correctly assess the political regime effect, I have 
included a dummy variable, taking value one in the (democratic) years where there were 
left-wing governments and zero otherwise9. The data come from Linz et al. (2005) and the 
expected sign of this variable is positive. On the other hand, in the years of universal male 
suffrage, the political process was not fully democratic, but there was some pluralism and 
the socialist party was allowed to stand for election. The power-resource theories refer 
exclusively to democratic periods. However, as noted in section 2, it seems reasonable to 
assume that social-democracy might also have had a positive effect on social spending even 
in not fully democratic times. For this reason, the regressions also include the interaction 
between the variable for universal male suffrage and the percentage of the socialist party’s 
seats in the Spanish parliament in that period. The expected sign of this variable is positive. 
Once again, the data come from Linz et al. (2005). 
                                                          
7
 The years of the Spanish civil war, 1936-39, have been excluded from the analysis because of the lack of 
data. 
8
 The years categorised here as dictatorship coincide with the years for which the variable xconst (executive 
constraint), devised by Marshall and Jaggers (2010) for the Polity IV project, takes value 1, that is, when the 
executive has unlimited authority. The years of dictatorship also coincide with the years for which the polity 
index (also from the Polity IV project) takes the lowest values (-7 in most years). In turn, the years of 
democracy coincide with the years in which the polity index takes the highest values (varying between 7 and 
10). The remaining years (which are categorised here as census suffrage and male suffrage) take intermediate 
values (varying between -6 and 6). For the econometric analysis, however, preference has been given to using 
the dichotomous variables explained above. The reason for this is that the polity index is a continuous 
variable. This means assuming that the political regime effect is linear (and in the following order: democracy 
> census democracy > dictatorship). However, this is not necessarily the case (Lindert 2004) and, in any 
event, it is the hypothesis this paper wants to test. 
9
 Quantitative studies addressing the power-resource hypothesis generally include parties with ties to the 
labour movement (socialists, social-democrats, communists, labour parties, etc.); sometimes also include 
“other” left-wing parties. See, for example, Swank’s (2013) database referring the post-1950 period. In Spain, 
all of the left-wing governments that held power in the years of democracy enjoyed the support or presence of 
the socialist party. Therefore, there is no difference here. 
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Lastly, following the model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), the political mobilisation 
of opposition groups under dictatorship might have some impact on social spending. In the 
final years of Franco’s dictatorship, opposition movements (among which the labour 
movement played a very significant role) took on growing importance (Tusell 2005). 
Because these movements were underground, however, there is no data to determine 
precisely the extent of political mobilisation, either in the labour movement or in the 
political opposition in general10. To measure government’s response to bottom-up pressure, 
I use the number of government changes in the preceding five years as an indicator of 
political instability. The data come from Urquijo (2001). This variable, however, does not 
exclusively reflect the opposition’s ability to mobilise under dictatorship. It also reflects 
possible internal government crises (due to succession crises or to external shocks, such as 
an economic crisis). Nevertheless, these crises are windows of opportunity that increase the 
effective pressure that can be exerted by the opposition (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). As 
a result, they do not affect the core argument. What is relevant here is whether the 
government increases social spending when it is unstable and needs political legitimacy. 
The expected sign is positive11. 
The control variables include GDP per capita, the percentage of population over 65 years 
old, trade openness, inequality level, and government’s fiscal capacity. GDP-per-capita 
figures come from Prados de la Escosura (2003). The data on the percentage of population 
over 65 years old come from Nicolau (2005). Trade openness is measured as the sum of 
imports plus exports divided by GDP. The figures come from Tena (2005). Inequality 
figures correspond to the Gini index prepared by Prados de la Escosura (2008), and the 
government’s fiscal capacity has been measured by the ratio between the central 
government’s tax revenues and the outstanding public debt (also of the central 
government). The larger this quotient is, the greater the state’s fiscal capacity is understood 
to be. The expected sign of this variable is, therefore, positive. The data come from Comín 
and Díaz (2005). All the variables are in logarithms to derive elasticities.   
 
Results  
Since the analysis involves time-series, before moving onto the regression analysis, it has 
first been tested whether or not the series are stationary. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
and the Phillips-Perron test have been applied to the series included in the model. The 
results indicate that all of them are integrated series of order one, I (1) (table 1). Then, it has 
been tested whether the series are cointegrated. The Engle-Granger cointegration test has 
been applied to the residuals of the OLS estimation in table 3. The results confirm that the 
series are cointegrated (see table 2). When the series are cointegrated, the OLS estimator is 
                                                          
10
 One possible alternative to the lack of information would be strike records. However, strikes were punished 
as sedition crime under Franco’s dictatorship until the 1960s. Afterwards, these became permitted but only if 
they called for economic demands. Therefore there is no information on strikes before 1963 (Maluquer de 
Motes and Llonch 2005). 
11
 If the variable PM is removed, PR’s effect remains similar; results available upon request. 
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consistent, but it presents problems of asymptotic bias and is not an efficient estimator. In 
order to give robustness to the analysis, in addition to the Least Squares estimation, I have 
also reported the results using Dynamic Least Squares (DOLS) and Fully Modified Least 
Squares (FMOLS). Both of these methods can deal with possible problems deriving from 
the existence of a cointegration relation. The first method does so by including lags and 
leads of the stochastic regressors in differences, while the second uses a semi-parametric 
correction of the least-squares estimator (Stock and Watson 1993, Phillips and Hansen 
1990). Both estimators are equivalent and asymptotically efficient. 
 
[Table 1] 
[Table 2] 
[Table 3] 
 
Regression results appear in table 3. The control variables are, in general, significant and 
have the expected sign. The ageing of the population, for example, shows a positive and 
statistically significant sign, in line with the studies by Lindert (2004) and Mulligan et al. 
(2010). GDP per capita, in turn, presents a negative sign, suggesting that social spending 
was countercyclical (please, keep in mind that variables are in logs, reflecting elasticities). 
In this respect, it seems that if there was any modernisation effect associated to social 
spending growth it has been captured in the regressions by the ageing of the population 
(which is, in part, a by-product of economic development)12. Inequality shows a negative 
coefficient too, confirming Lindert’s Robin Hood paradox and previous results by Espuelas 
(2015). Trade openness, meanwhile, shows a positive sign. Apparently, the demand effect 
proposed by Rodrik (1997) predominated over the race to the bottom effect, confirming the 
results by Sáenz et al. (2013) for Spain in 1960-2000. Finally, fiscal capacity appears 
statistically non-significant. This does not mean, however, that high social spending can be 
maintained over time without increasing taxation at some point. This simply means that 
variations in social spending are not correlated to variations in fiscal capacity. In 1977, for 
example, when income tax was introduced (after the advent of democracy), social spending 
had been growing since around 1967. The 1977 tax reform made social spending growth 
sustainable over time. But, the increase in social spending and fiscal capacity creation did 
not occur exactly at the same moment.  
As for the political variables, the results show that the introduction of universal male 
suffrage in 1890 had a gross negative effect. However, the coefficient associated with the 
percentage of the socialist party’s seats has a positive sign, which is significant in all 
equations and greater than the negative coefficient of male suffrage. Taking into account 
                                                          
12
 To confirm that the results are not driven by the presence of the ageing of population and GDP per capita I 
have re-run the regressions without those variables, and using social spending (instead of social 
spending/GDP) as the dependent variable. The main results remain and are available upon request. 
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that this variable is a percentage that ranges between 0 and 100, the size of the coefficient 
indicates that the negative effect of universal male suffrage would be offset by less than 1% 
of the seats being occupied by social-democrats. These results confirm that caciquismo, 
corruption and electoral fraud were successful in neutralising the potential positive effect of 
universal male suffrage; but, at the same time, suggest that even in a fraudulent system like 
that of the Bourbon Restoration, political leaders were not entirely immune to demands 
from below. The results, actually, indicate that the political elite became willing to make 
social concessions in the face of the electoral advance of social-democracy (despite the 
latter never rose above a very low level of representation). This confirms the importance 
that qualitative studies have placed on the rise of the labour movement in the beginnings of 
Spanish social policy (Gabriel 2004, Castillo and Montero 2008). Also, this concurs with 
the results of Curto-Grau et al. (2012), which show that road public investment in 1880-
1914 was partly motivated by the government’s pursuit of political stability. Indeed, the 
gradual (and small) increase in electoral representation of Spanish social-democracy after 
1910 coincided with a period of increased social unrest. In that sense, it is likely that the 
positive statistical effect of social-democracy is, in fact, capturing the elite reaction to that 
increase in political instability (and not only the effect of the electoral growth of social-
democracy).13 
Democracy, for its part, has a clearly positive and statistically significant effect. The 
extension of voting rights to the whole population stimulates social spending growth. The 
size of the coefficient, moreover, is much greater than in the case of male suffrage and 
dictatorship. Instead, the coefficient associated with the variable dictatorship is not 
statistically significant, indicating that its impact on social policy was similar to that of the 
years of elite democracy (our baseline period). By contrast, the number of government 
changes under dictatorship does have a positive effect and is statistically significant. This 
suggests that dictatorships responded to political instability with social spending increases. 
However, the size of the coefficient is much smaller than that of the variable democracy, 
meaning that the positive effect of political instability (under dictatorship) falls far short of 
offsetting the negative effect that derives from the absence of democracy. 
Lastly, the presence of left-wing parties in government during the years of democracy did 
not have any significant effect on social spending. This is partly explained by the arrival of 
democracy per se, which obliged all parties to take into account the preferences of all 
voters (including low-income voters). Also, the emergence of the Keynesian consensus in 
Europe after World War II further helped to blur the distinctions among left-wing and right-
wing parties (Hicks 1999). In Spain, the (belated) equivalent of the Keynesian consensus 
came with the 1977 Moncloa Pacts, in which the main political parties agreed, as noted 
earlier, to implement a policy of wage moderation and inflation control in return for the 
                                                          
13
 The problem when it comes to distinguish between the effect of the electoral growth of social-democracy 
and that of increased social unrest is that there is no data, starting in 1850, to control for the latter. In any case, 
both aspects were in fact the result of the same process: the political crisis of the Bourbon Restoration period. 
When the civil-servants’ pensions are included in the analysis the positive effect of the “socialist seats” 
vanishes. This is because civil-servants’ pensions were still big in relative terms, and therefore hide 
significant changes in the rest of public social spending.  
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introduction of income tax and social policy expansion. Thus, social spending began to 
grow rapidly from the outset of democracy, including the first centre-right governments of 
the UCD party (Union of the Democratic Centre) and later socialist governments (1982-
96). The rapid social spending growth of the early democratic years could also be 
interpreted as the result of the backwardness accumulated during Franco’s dictatorship. 
Huber et al. (2008), indeed, also found (for Latin-American countries) that partisanship had 
no effect on social spending after highly repressive, dictatorial periods. They argue that 
left-wing parties entered democratic periods as relatively weak actors. On the other hand, 
after 1985 and, especially, after the Maastricht Treaty of 1992-93, both socialist and centre-
right governments of the Partido Popular (1996-2000) have put greater priority on public 
deficit and inflation control than on social spending expansion. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
In the Second Republic, however, the qualitative evidence suggests that the consensus in 
favour of social policy was smaller and that the socialist party (together with other left-
wing parties) actually went to great lengths to put social issues at the centre of the political 
agenda (Samaniego 1988). To test this possibility, the regressions in table 3 have been 
repeated, but this time including a multiplicative variable for the years of the Second 
Republic. The results must be interpreted with caution because this period was very short 
and, therefore, there are few available observations. As is shown in table 4, left-wing 
governments during the Second Republic effectively had a positive impact on social 
spending. This seems to confirm Hicks (1999) hypothesis that differences between left-
wing and right-wing parties were more significant before the Keynesian consensus. 
However, one potential concern when analysing the relation between the political regime 
and social spending arises with the possible issue of endogeneity. Since social spending 
contributes to political stability, it might influence the type of political regime. Also, if 
redistribution demands are high, high-income groups can prefer nondemocratic regimes 
(Boix 2003). Both cases would raise an issue of inverse causality. There might also be a 
problem of omitted variables affecting the coefficients of the variables of interest14.  To 
make the analysis more robust, the estimations in table 3 have been repeated, but this time 
using instrumental variables. The results appear in table 5. As instruments for the political 
regime (which, in this case, are three variables: democracy, dictatorship and universal male 
suffrage), I have used the percentage of the working-age population that has completed 
secondary education and the type of political regime (democracy, dictatorship and universal 
male suffrage) in other southern European countries: Italy, Greece and Portugal15. In 
                                                          
14
 Some of these variables may be observable but hard to measure (as ideological changes, for example) or 
data may be unavailable (as union-membership or strikes in our time-period); others may simply be 
unobservable. 
15
 As before, each of these countries has been classified as democratic following Boix et al. (2012). In the 
remaining years, they have been classified as “dictatorship” when the variable xconst of Marshall and Jaggers 
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column 1, I have instrumented simultaneously for the three variables relating to political 
regime (democracy, dictatorship and universal male suffrage). In columns 2 through 4, I 
have instrumented for each of these variables individually (the instrument used for 
democracy has been democracy in southern Europe and the completion rate for secondary 
education; for dictatorship, dictatorship in southern Europe and the completion rate for 
secondary education; and for male suffrage, completion rate for secondary education and 
male suffrage in southern Europe). In all of the regressions (from columns 1 to 4), a 
redundancy test has been applied. The instruments that did not pass the test were eliminated 
from the regressions. 
 
[Table 5] 
 
The reason to use these instruments is that the political and institutional context of other 
southern-European countries is likely to have conditioned the evolution of the political 
regime in Spain, for example, through an imitation effect or diplomatic pressures. However, 
there is no apparent reason to assume that Spanish social spending had any impact on the 
political regime existing in other countries. Similarly, it is possible that demands for 
democratisation increase when education levels of the adult population are higher. 
However, current social spending cannot have a significant influence on the current stock 
of education, which depends on decisions taken many years earlier. Nor is there any 
theoretical reason to expect that the political regime of a neighbouring country or growth in 
the stock of human capital per se will cause a rise or fall in social spending. As table 5 
shows, the instruments are reasonably strong. The first-stage F-statistic is above 10 in all 
equations. In equations 1 and 3, where the number of instruments exceeds the number of 
regressors, the p-values from the Sargan test are clearly greater than 0.1, indicating that 
there is no evidence that the instruments are correlated with the error term.  
Regarding the results, the size and sign of the coefficients of the variables of interest are 
similar to those in table 3. Democracy has a positive and highly significant effect on social 
spending; universal male suffrage (in a not fully democratic context) has an initially 
negative effect that becomes easily offset by the socialist-party’s parliamentary seats, and 
dictatorship has no statistically significant effect. The IV results, therefore, confirm table 
3’s results. Indeed, according to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, there is no 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the regressors are exogenous. This is not entirely 
surprising. As noted earlier, high and low social spending levels occurred both under 
democratic and nondemocratic regimes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
(2010) takes a value of 1 and as “universal male suffrage” when the right to vote formally existed but Boix et 
al. (2012) do not consider it as a fully democratic period. Figures on the percentage of working-age 
population with secondary education or greater have been calculated from Núñez (2005); after 1964 they have 
been linked to the series provided by IVIE (2014). 
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Political Regime and Long-Term Trends  
The analysis presented so far (based on dummy variables) captures the “average” impact of 
each political regime, once we control for a set control variables. However, when one looks 
at the long-run evolution of social spending, one does not see a steady trend with (more or 
less abrupt) step changes associated with changes in the political regime. Instead, in the 
Spanish case one can observe two clearly differentiated patterns or social spending regimes, 
along with a long transition process between them (figure 1). The first regime, which could 
be called the traditional regime, is characterised by low social spending, and covers the 
time-period between 1850 and the nineteen-thirties. The second regime, or modern regime, 
extends from the nineteen-seventies to the present day and is characterised by high social 
spending. This long-term pattern is partly determined by the cumulative nature of social 
policy. In Spain, as in many European countries, the growth in social spending is explained 
by the gradual introduction of new social programmes, often in a piecemeal way. Also, in 
countries like Spain where the development of social policy was based on the creation of 
Bismarckian social–insurance schemes, initial social programmes were often limited to 
certain segments of the population, typically low- and medium-income, industrial workers. 
Therefore, the growth in social spending can also be explained by the gradual expansion of 
coverage to the entire population and by the improved generosity of social benefits.  
In Spain, however, the transition process from the traditional to the modern social spending 
regime was not linear, but went through periods of stagnation and of rapid growth. It is 
interesting to ask what impact the political regime had on this transition process. In this 
context one would expect the impact (if any) of the political regime to consist primarily in 
changes in the long-run growth trend and not so much in changes in levels. To test this 
possibility, the regressions in table 3 have been repeated with the inclusion of a dummy 
variable (taking value 1 for the post-1931 period and zero for the preceding years), and also 
a time-trend for the post-1931 period (which takes value 1 in 1931, increases linearly in the 
subsequent years, and takes value zero prior to 1931). It should be recalled that 1931 saw 
the proclamation of the Second Republic, Spain’s first democratic regime. Therefore, the 
aim is to capture with these variables the potential change in trend and levels associated 
with the arrival of democracy. Together with these variables, it has been also included a 
time-trend for the post-1931 period, squared. The reason for this is that one would expect 
the rate of growth to moderate once high levels of social spending have been achieved (that 
is, once the transition from the traditional regime to the modern regime of social spending 
is complete). Lastly, to capture the effect of Franco’s dictatorship, the regressions also 
include the interaction between the years of dictatorship and the post-1931 dummy variable 
as well as the interaction between the variable dictatorship and the post-1931 trend. 
 
[Table 6] 
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The results appear in table 6. Both the post-1931 dummy variable and the post-1931 time-
trend have a positive and statistically significant effect. As one would expect, the square of 
the post-1931 time-trend, for its part, shows a negative and statistically significant sign. 
This suggests that the arrival of democracy in Spain not only entailed an increase in the 
levels of social spending, but also caused a change in its long-run trend, accelerating the 
growth rate of social spending. Subsequently, once high levels of social spending had been 
reached, the growth rate again levelled out. Regarding the role of dictatorship, the 
interaction between the years of dictatorship and the post-1931 dummy variable is not 
statistically significant. However, the interaction between the dictatorship and the post-
1931 time-trend has a negative sign and is statistically significant. Rather than an abrupt 
return to the pre-1931 levels, the negative effect of the dictatorship consisted in reversing 
the acceleration in social spending initiated in 1931. In other words, Franco’s dictatorship 
halted the modernisation process (the transition from the traditional regime to the modern 
regime of social spending) that began with the arrival of democracy in 1931.  
This, in turn, suggests that the best way to analyse the impact of the political regime does 
not always involve analysing the changes occurring in the years immediately before or after 
a regime change. As has been shown, the effect can be more gradual than an abrupt step 
change. Guillén (1992), for instance, found that, although “these regime changes would 
lead one to expect radical discontinuities” (p. 119), “the most salient feature of social policy 
during the Spanish transition to democracy was its high degree of continuity” (p. 137). By 
taking a broader perspective, however, one can appreciate the effect of the political regime 
much better. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Although the role of political factors has sometimes been denied, this paper shows that 
democracy in Spain had a clearly positive effect on both the level of social spending and its 
long-term trend. The arrival of democracy in 1931 led to a modernisation process involving 
a shift from a traditional regime (of low social spending) to a modern regime (with high 
social spending). This process, however, was interrupted by Franco’s dictatorship, which 
reversed this change in trend, slowing the ultimate growth in social spending. Democratic 
and non-democratic regimes are not invariant across time. Democracy today is different 
from democracy in 1931 and Franco’s dictatorship in 1975 was different from it in 1945. 
However, we can define some minimal aspects to consider a political regime as democratic 
or not over time. It makes sense to ask whether those minimal aspects are relevant for 
social spending or not; and the results indicate that they are. Democracy can, indeed, 
explain a substantial variation in social spending (4.5-6% of GDP, depending on the 
regression we take as a reference). This does not mean, however, that the political regime 
impact is limited to social spending. It could also have an impact on other aspects of social 
policy16, but these are beyond the scope of this paper. Similarly, this does not mean that the 
                                                          
16
 Pons and Vilar (2014) or Espuelas (2012), for example, suggest that Franco’s dictatorship was more pro-
social-contributions (and anti-tax-funded programs) than democracy. 
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political regime can explain all the variation in social spending. There are many other 
factors in play. Here, I have controlled for some of them, but there can also be omitted 
variables. To deal with the potential issue of omitted variables an IV analysis has been 
undertaken (using secondary school completion and the political regime in southern Europe 
as instruments for the Spanish political regime). The IV results confirm democracy’s 
positive effect. 
This paper also shows other interesting nuances about the role of political factors. Political 
instability during the years of dictatorship gave rise to modest increases in social spending, 
although they were entirely insufficient to offset the negative effect of dictatorships. 
Meanwhile, the introduction of universal male suffrage in the late nineteenth century (in a 
context of caciquismo and widespread electoral fraud) had no positive effect on social 
spending. What did have a positive effect, by contrast, was the weak electoral growth of 
social-democracy (and more generally the growth of the labour movement and social 
unrest) in this same nondemocratic context. The political elite of the Bourbon Restoration 
were, at least partly, reacting to demands from below, although social spending remained 
very low throughout the entire period. During the years of democracy, by contrast, left-
wing governments had no significant effect on social spending (with the exception perhaps 
of the nineteen-thirties). This is explained partly by the effect of democracy per se (which 
obliged all parties to take into account the preferences of all citizens), but also by the 
emergence of the Keynesian consensus (whose Spanish equivalent were the 1977 Moncloa 
Pacts). Curiously, the role of left-wing parties was more visible in the nineteen-thirties 
(prior to the Keynesian consensus) and in the Bourbon Restoration (when the preferences 
of low-income groups were systematically ignored). 
 
Appendix 
Figure A1. Spanish public social spending (% of GDP), 1850-2000  
 
Source: see figure 1. 
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Table 1. Unit root tests 
Test specification: constant Test specification: trend and constant 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
 
Phillips-Perron 
 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
 
Phillips-Perron 
 
t-Statistic t-Statistic t-Statistic t-Statistic 
In levels:                  
Log(social spending) -0.060  0.050  -1.849  -2.039  
Log(GDP per capita) 1.706  2.076  -0.467  -0.269  
Log(population 65) 3.711  3.278  0.164  -0.259  
Log(Gini) -2.545  -2.446  -2.535  -2.437  
Log(openness) -2.108  -2.049  -2.694  -2.600  
Log(fiscal revenues/public debt) -0.840  -0.743  -1.761  -1.580  
    
In differences:     
Log(social spending) -16.243***  -17.229***  -16.217***  -17.362***  
Log(GDP per capita) -9.589***  -9.589***  -9.920***  -9.896***  
Log(population 65) -14.610***  -14.558***  -15.728***  -15.238***  
Log(Gini) -14.349***  -14.438***  -14.302***  -14.392***  
Log(openness) -10.241***  -13.403***  -10.265***  -13.397***  
Log(fiscal revenues/public debt) -8.823***  -8.851***    -8.794***  -8.823***  
Null hypothesis: the variable has a unit root, * rejection at 10%, ** rejection at 5%, *** rejection at 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Engle-Granger cointegration test 
Model specification t-statistic 
constant -10.358*** 
trend and constant -10.407*** 
Note: test from the regressions in table 3. 
Null hypothesis: series are not cointegrated, *** rejection at 1%.  
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Table 3. Political regime and social spending (1850-2000) 
Dep. variable: Log(social spending) OLS     DOLS     FMOLS     
Male suffrage -0.472 [0.098] *** -0.571 [0.129] *** -0.525 [0.096] *** 
Male suffrage * socialist MPs 0.688 [0.172] *** 0.572 [0.282] ** 0.709 [0.168] *** 
Democracy 1.874 [0.243] *** 1.753 [0.353] *** 1.842 [0.239] *** 
Democracy * left government 0.088 [0.107]  0.096 [0.157]  0.119 [0.104]  
Dictatorship 0.357 [0.224]  0.160 [0.336]  0.326 [0.219]  
Dictatorship*government turnover 0.370 [0.058] *** 0.468 [0.115] *** 0.406 [0.057] *** 
 
Log(GDP per capita) -1.694 [0.290] *** -1.875 [0.388] *** -1.913 [0.280] *** 
Log(population 65) 1.841 [0.695] *** 2.846 [0.961] *** 2.313 [0.690] *** 
Log(Gini) -0.696 [0.259] *** -0.895 [0.382] ** -0.744 [0.257] *** 
Log(openness) 0.360 [0.119] *** 0.115 [0.186] 0.308 [0.118] ** 
Log(fiscal revenues/public debt) -0.006 [0.083] -0.008 [0.125] -0.003 [0.081] 
Constant 12.383 [2.923] *** 13.680 [3.877] *** 14.458 [2.824] *** 
Time-trend 0.016 [0.006] ** 0.016 [0.009] * 0.017 [0.006] ** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.990 0.993 0.991 
S.E. of regression 0.263 0.221 0.257 
Obs.  147     147     147     
Note: All regressions include a time-dummy for the post-Spanish-civil-war period. Espuelas (2013) warns that there is a jump in his social spending series in 1967 due to problems 
in the original sources. To control for it, I have included a time-dummy for the time-period after that year. The main results remain when these time-dummies are removed, 
although the general fit of the regressions decreases. 
Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Left-wing governments’ impact before 1936 
Dependent variable: Log(social spending) OLS     DOLS     FMOLS     
Male suffrage -0.434 [0.096] *** -0.447 [0.125] *** -0.485 [0.091] *** 
Male suffrage * socialist MPs 0.699 [0.167] *** 0.571 [0.260] ** 0.699 [0.158] *** 
Democracy 1.659 [0.245] *** 1.409 [0.351] *** 1.644 [0.234] *** 
Democracy * left government -0.031 [0.111]  0.027 [0.149]  0.030 [0.104]  
2nd republic * left government 0.811 [0.257] *** 1.699 [0.578] *** 0.787 [0.243] *** 
Dictatorship 0.353 [0.217]  0.206 [0.320]  0.308 [0.207]  
Dictatorship*government turnover 0.312 [0.059] *** 0.370 [0.124] *** 0.345 [0.056] *** 
 
Log(GDP per capita) -1.530 [0.286] *** -1.337 [0.417] *** -1.743 [0.270] *** 
Log(population 65) 2.238 [0.685] *** 3.047 [0.875] *** 2.548 [0.664] *** 
Log(Gini) -0.644 [0.251] ** -0.442 [0.382] -0.637 [0.244] ** 
Log(openness) 0.290 [0.118] ** 0.066 [0.178] 0.240 [0.114] ** 
Log(fiscal revenues/public debt) 0.049 [0.082] 0.121 [0.124] 0.063 [0.078] 
Constant 10.299 [2.904] *** 8.043 [4.325] * 12.587 [2.742] *** 
Time-trend 0.011 [0.006] * 0.003 [0.010] 0.012 [0.006] ** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991 0.994 0.991 
S.E. of regression 0.255 0.212 0.247 
Obs.  147     147     147     
Note: Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5. IV regressions 
      
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Dep. variable: Log(social spending) (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
      
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Male suffrage 
-0.311 (0.185) * -0.482 (0.135) *** -0.438 (0.128) *** -0.643 (0.296) ** 
Democracy 1.864 (0.394) *** 1.827 (0.515) *** 1.997 (0.392) *** 1.651 (0.433) *** 
Dictatorship 0.461 (0.379)  0.322 (0.399)  0.498 (0.424)  0.144 (0.409)  
    
Male suffrage * socialist MPs 0.635 (0.217) *** 0.670 (0.236) *** 0.750 (0.229) *** 0.657 (0.173) *** 
Democracy * left government 0.111 (0.111)  0.093 (0.111)  0.086 (0.102)  0.100 (0.105)  
Dictatorship*government turnover 0.345 (0.072) *** 0.368 (0.059) *** 0.362 (0.059) *** 0.369 (0.056) *** 
Log(GDP per capita) 
-1.470 (0.333) *** -1.680 (0.307) *** -1.719 (0.283) *** -1.796 (0.325) *** 
Log(population 65) 1.925 (0.827) ** 1.783 (0.866) ** 2.067 (0.882) ** 1.552 (0.817) * 
Log(Gini) 
-0.603 (0.275) ** -0.701 (0.249) *** -0.702 (0.246) *** -0.804 (0.304) *** 
Log(openness) 0.263 (0.140) * 0.354 (0.127) *** 0.373 (0.118) *** 0.407 (0.138) *** 
Log(fiscal revenues/public debt) 0.056 (0.095)  -0.006 (0.079)  -0.009 (0.079)  -0.053 (0.110)  
Constant 10.068 (3.329) *** 12.276 (2.905) *** 12.35 (2.773) *** 13.57 (3.427) *** 
Time-trend 0.012 (0.009)  0.017 (0.010) * 0.014 (0.009)  0.023 (0.012) * 
Instrumented Male suffrage        --        -- Male suffrage 
 
Democracy Democracy        --        -- 
  
Dictatorship        -- Dictatorship        -- 
Instruments Male suffrage  (southern Europe) 
   Male suffrage  
(southern Europe) 
 
 
Democracy  
(southern Europe) 
    
 
Dictatorship  
(southern Europe) 
  Dictatorship  
(southern Europe) 
  
  
Secondary 
school completion 
 Secondary 
school completion 
 Secondary 
school completion 
 
    
 
F-statistic, first stage 11.220  33.065  22.059  14.874  
Sargan test (p-value) 0.209  --  0.883  --  
DWH test (p-value) 0.629  0.918  0.699  0.536  
Observations 147  147  147  147  
Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 6. Social spending long-term trends (1850-2000) 
Dependent variable: Log(social spending) OLS     DOLS     FMOLS     
Post-1931 dummy 2.062 [0.274] *** 1.905 [0.300] *** 2.018 [0.251] *** 
Post-1931 trend 0.058 [0.014] *** 0.037 [0.017] ** 0.050 [0.013] *** 
Post-1931 trend squared -.0004 [0.000] ** -.0001 [0.000] -.0003 [0.000] * 
Post-1931 dummy*dictatorship 0.596 [0.472] 0.444 [0.689] 0.629 [0.443] 
Post-1931 trend*dictatorship -0.041 [0.011] *** -0.034 [0.016] ** -0.041 [0.010] *** 
Male suffrage -0.387 [0.096] *** -0.413 [0.111] *** -0.410 [0.087] *** 
Male suffrage * socialist MPs 0.667 [0.173] *** 0.372 [0.248] 0.650 [0.158] *** 
Democracy * left government 0.054 [0.104] -0.089 [0.135] 0.070 [0.094] 
Dictatorship 0.331 [0.219] 0.029 [0.267] 0.316 [0.200] 
Dictatorship*government turnover 0.264 [0.068] *** 0.378 [0.112] *** 0.296 [0.062] *** 
Log(GDP per capita) -1.341 [0.423] *** -1.489 [0.594] ** -1.449 [0.386] *** 
Log(population 65) 1.866 [0.692] *** 2.752 [0.802] *** 2.187 [0.643] *** 
Log(Gini) -0.397 [0.259] -0.376 [0.352] -0.406 [0.242] * 
Log(openness) 0.364 [0.145] ** -0.017 [0.222] 0.342 [0.133] ** 
Log(fiscal revenues/public debt) 0.115 [0.097] 0.252 [0.132] * 0.145 [0.088] 
Constant 8.814 [4.936] * 10.777 [6.876] 9.795 [4.520] ** 
Time-trend 0.008 [0.008] 0.008 [0.010] 0.008 [0.008] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991 0.994 0.992 
S.E. of regression 0.252 0.211 0.244 
Obs.  147     147     147     
Note: Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
